I. Introduction I. Introduction
This paper is about the gap between the economic performance of the United States as contrasted to the main western European countries over the last two centuries.
1 First, why has the U. S. represented the frontier of economic performance for most of the last two centuries? Second, given that the U. S. was at the frontier, why did Europe not catch up steadily and converge to the U. S. level, as implied by many growth models? Why did Europe fall so far back beneath the frontier and take so long to catch up? Third, how do we interpret data showing that Europe has recently almost caught up with the U. S. in the level of output per hour (labor productivity) but remains significantly behind in output per capita? How could
Europe be so productive yet so poor?
2
The analysis of U. S. at the frontier and Europe's falling behind combines many elements of analysis that, singly or in groups, have appeared in the literature before. But they
have not yet been combined in the fully comprehensive tableau provided here. We divide the sources of U. S. advantage both chronologically (pre-and post-1913) and by cause, separating the subset of factors that were related to political and economic unity, i.e., that Europe could have achieved in a hypothetical "United States of Europe" (USE) in effect after 1870, from the set of advantages of the U. S. that were independent of political and economic unity. We
4. An exception is that we do raise questions about the Maddison data on hours per employee, which may contain errors that distort the analysis of Figure 4 below. Also, a loose cannon on the deck of current assessments of long-term economic growth is created by the 1999 revisions of the U. S. national accounts (NIPA), which raise the growth rate of real GDP by more than 1.0 percent per annum for the interval 1929-48, as compared to previous NIPA estimates used by Maddison and everyone else. These revisions, which are not included in the analysis of this paper, greatly increase the magnitude of the "big wave" phenomenon emphasized in Gordon (2000a) and to a lesser extent in this paper. Figure 1 are log-linear interpolations between 1820, 1850, 1870, 1891, 1900, 1913, 1923, 1929, 1941, 1950, 1963, 1973, 1979, 1987, 1994, and 2000. on output per capita and output per hour and then subsequently turn to the explanations.
As indicated in the Data Appendix, the lines in
While doubtless many issues about the accuracy of the Maddison data could be raised, these are beyond the scope of this paper, and henceforth all the Maddison data will be treated as if they are absolutely correct. 4 Plotted on a log scale for selected years that are "neutral" to the business cycle, i.e., excluding the influence of recessions, depressions, and wars, the most striking fact displayed in Figure 1 is the steady and inexorable advance of U. S. real GDP per capita. 5 While the growth rate is slower in the first 50 years, between 1820 and 1870, subsequent to 1870 there is surprisingly little variation around the 1870-2000 average growth rate of 1.81 per year, a rate sufficient to double the standard of living every 38 years. The major acceleration above the long-run trend comes, surprisingly, not in the early postwar years but in the decade 1963-73, followed by a retardation back to trend in 1987-94.
In Europe the average growth rate between 1870 and 2000 is a modestly slower 1.67
percent, but progress in Europe was much more erratic than in the U. S. Europe fell steadily behind the U. S. through 1913, then suffered downward dislocations associated with both world wars, followed by a sharp reversal and catch-up during the golden years 1950-73 and then an evident failure to close the remaining gap after 1973. 6. Maddison (1995) presents output per hour only for 1870, 1913, 1929, 1938, 1950, 1973, and 1992 . The Data Appendix explains the updating of his data to the year 2000. The real GDP data are the same as used in Figure 1 , which are available annually after 1870, but Maddison's hours data have been developed only for the listed years.
7. Compared to the 1.37 percent cited in the text, the annual growth rate in the current BLS data for output per hour in the nonfarm private business sector over the 1973-2000 interval is 1.56 percent. This difference reflects the broader Maddison concept of real GDP per hour, which includes the government, nonprofit, and household sectors with their slower or nonexistent rates of measured productivity growth.
The equivalent record for labor productivity, i.e., real GDP per hour worked, is displayed in Figure 2 for fewer and longer intervals dictated by data availability. 6 The U. S.
record of productivity growth is not as steady as for output per-capita and displays its strongest performance for the 1938-50 interval, with the 1950-73 interval in second rank and the 1973-92 "growth slowdown" period ranked far below any of the other sub-intervals
shown. In the data of Figure 2 , the growth rate of output per hour during the "big wave" sub- 8. An example of such a misleading table appears in Landes (1998, Table 26 .1, p. 459), which simply presents growth rates of GDP and of labor productivity in manufacturing for the U. S., U. K., Japan and Germany, for the years 1950-87 with no context at all, either in the form of levels or pre-1950 growth rates. The Europe/U. S. ratio for productivity growth in Figure 3 begins in 1870 rather than 1820 and exhibits the same downward slide at about the same rate, from 79 percent in 1870 to 47 percent in 1950. Throughout the subinterval 1870-1950, the productivity ratio in Figure   3 is below the ratio of output per capita for comparable years, indicating that Europe had a higher level of hours per capita than did the U. S. After 1950 the relationship between the level and growth of the two ratios reverses completely, with much faster growth in the productivity ratio than in the ratio of output per capita, a continuation of that growth well past 1973 into the late 1990s, and perhaps most important, nearly complete convergence of the level of European productivity to the U. S. level by the late 1990s. Clearly, hours per capita in Europe nosedived relative to the U. S. in the last half of the twentieth century.
Much of the fascinating detail of Figures 1-3 
which states that output per capita equals labor productivity times annual hours per employee, times employment per member of the population. In Figure 4 the black line is the Europe/U. S. ratio of output per capita divided by the Europe/U. S. ratio of output per hour, and this shows a decline from 109 percent in 1950 to a 83 percent in the year 2000. By definition any changes in this ratio must be completely explained by changes in the same direction in the product of the hours/employee and employment/population ratios, as shown by the light dashed and solid grey lines, respectively.
Both of these ratios contributed to the divergent behavior of productivity compared to output per capita. The surge in U. S. output per capita in the 1963-73 period that is evident 9. The hours/employee data are provided in Maddison (1995) , Table J -4, p. 248 . The employment/population ratio in Figure 4 is calculated as a residual, using the definition in equation (1). It is possible that in Figure 4 the decline in the H/E ratio is too slow and the residual E/N ratio is too fast, because Maddison's data on H/E show a surprisingly small difference between Europe (1524 hours per year) and the U. S. (1589 hours per year) in 1992. In contrast, an unpublished worksheet from the OECD, dated June 13, 1996, shows for 1995 a much great difference, with U. S. hours per employee at 1952 per year, and the average of France, Germany, and the U. K. at 1641, fully 16 percent lower compared to 4 percent lower in the Maddison data. These respective numbers for 1998, also from OECD sources, are quoted as 1966 for the U. S. and 1644 for the average of the same three countries, also a difference of 16 percent (see Mishel et al. 2001, Mishel et al. (2001, Table 7.17, p. 398) contrasts male rates of 71.6 percent for the U. S. with respective rates for France, Germany, and Italy of 57.3, 61.4, and 55.6 percent. For women the U. S. figure of 57.1 percent contrasts for the same three countries with 41.6, 29.3, and 43.6 percent, respectively. in Figure 1 above can be explained by an increase in the labor force participation rate of teenagers and females. Starting in 1950, hours per employee in Europe dropped faster than in the U. S., while the employee/population ratio plummeted during the 1973-92 sub-interval. 9 It is well known that postwar European governments have encouraged (and/or labor unions have demanded) longer vacations, contributing to the decline in hours per employee in Europe. There is also a vast literature on the higher equilibrium rate of unemployment in Europe (the "NAIRU") and its substantially lower rate of labor force participation. American workers seem happy to be bribed to work long hours for premium overtime pay; as the quip goes, "Compulsory overtime is an unmitigated evil that every one of my workers wants his fair share of."
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By definition, the remaining causes of Europe's low standard of living relative to its high relative productivity must be accounted for by some combination of a higher structural unemployment rate and a lower labor force participation rate. The higher unemployment rate in Europe is at least partly due to more generous unemployment compensation, and the welfare adjustment is not obvious. But part of the unemployment is related to laws that have lengthened vacations and shortened weekly work hours, making workers more expensive to employ. German firms are refusing to expand employment and capital investment in in Germany, preferring to invest in nearby formerly communist countries to the east and southeast, as well as such far-flung countries as Mexico, Brazil, and India.
Less clear are the causes of lower European labor force participation compared to America. Are Italian men who retire early or housewives sitting at home (some of whom are tending to their unmarried 30-year-old sons) doing this because they choose to, or because the 13. Roughly 52 percent of Italians between the ages of 20 and 34 live at home with their parents (Rhoads, 2002 with few transport options other than the automobile. European real GDP is held down by the correctly measured high price of petrol, but sufficient credit is not given for convenience benefits from frequent bus, subway, and train (including TGV) public transit.
While an economist's first reaction is that the dispersion of U. S. metropolitan areas must be optimal, since people have chosen to buy houses in the outer suburbs, a more careful reaction would be to view the American dispersion as related to public policy in addition to 15 . The observant visitor to Europe will notice many small ways in which Europeans save on energy use that are not related to housing density, including escalators that are activated by a foot pressure pad but are turned off when not used, public rest rooms in which lights automatically go off when not in use, and hotel rooms where electric power is activated by inserting one's key card (in such hotel rooms the naive American private choice, especially subsidies to interstate highways in vast amounts relative to public transport, local zoning measures in some suburbs that prohibit residential land allocations below a fixed size, e.g., two acres, and the infamous and politically untouchable deduction of mortgage interest payments from income tax. Europeans enjoy shopping from small individually owned shops on lively central city main streets and pedestrian arcades, and recoil with distaste from the ubiquitous and cheerless American strip malls and big-box retailersalthough Carrefour, Ikea, and others provide American-like options in some European cities.
To counter the effects of American land use regulations that create overly dispersed metropolitan areas, Europeans counter with their own brand of land use rules that preserve greenbelts and inhibit growth of suburban and exurban retailing.
Tastes are in part the result of circumstances and habit, and to the European critique many Americans would deliver a counter-retort. An American mother of two small children wants nothing to do with schlepping those kids through endless tunnels while making connections on the London or Paris subways, or with waiting in the rain for the next bus, or with shopping for groceries more often than once per week. The three-quarters of American households living in single-family units treasure their backyards, decks, and barbeques and do not want to be forced to go to a public park for outdoor recreation -whose barbeque grill would they use?
In this debate I lean on the side of Europeans largely on the grounds of excessive American energy use and the huge waste of constructing all those prisons.
visitor may discover when returning from the day's activities that his laptop computer has a dead battery, because it was left on all day with no power in the room plugs!)
16. This is not intended to be a pun on the frequent flyer program of any airline.
considerations is inevitably subjective and culture-biased, I would conjecture that perhaps half of the remaining measured Europe/U. S. gap in living standards would vanish with a full balance sheet linking welfare to measured output. Since Europe produces its output with fewer hours per capita than the U. S., a complementary conclusion is that the Europe-U. S. productivity gap of 7 percent in Figure 3 The superiority of U. S. productivity performance in mid-century, around 1950, is not just a chimera displayed in possibly misleading macroeconomic statistics. It was real, and Europeans were far more intent than Americans in understanding its reality and puzzling over its sources. Viewed half a century later, what seems remarkable is that while Europe's post-1950 catch-up phase posted higher growth rates than the U. S., it did not fully catch up either by the measure of the living standard and or of productivity. For one country to retain international leadership for such a long period, since 1870 for the standard of living or before in the case of productivity, is, in the words of Wright (1990, p. 651) , "anomalous." Here we provide an overview of some of the more convincing explanations. This section focusses on those sources of American leadership that were already evident in 1913; the post-1913 era is treated in a separate section below.
17. The United States of Europe (USE) "device" pops up throughout this paper. It is intended to focus attention on the role of open internal trade, migration, and finance, within the United States of 1870-1913. Clearly, a USE would have implied far more for the Europe/U. S. productivity ratio than just the consequences of openness, since a USE would never have gone to war with itself, both World Wars I and II would have been avoided, and the entire twentieth-century history of European economic performance would have been totally changed.
18. For instance, Wright (1990, Chart 5) shows that Europe as a whole had higher iron ore reserves than the United States in 1910.
Advantages from American Political Union Advantages from American Political Union
Since most of the Europe/U. S. gap has now been closed, those explanations that contain an element of reversal are more convincing than those that do not. The different, overlapping, and mainly complementary hypotheses can also be sorted by asking which rely on the political union of a continent-sized country, the United States, in contrast to the political fragmentation of Europe. More precisely, would a United States of Europe established in 1870 have been able to keep up with the American productivity frontier? 17 Natural Resource Intensity. An important explanation, partly because it is reversible, is offered by Wright (1990) and Nelson-Wright (1992) . At the turn of the last century, the U. S. was by far the leading producer of every raw material essential to manufacturing, and its lead extended in the 1920s and 1930s through the discovery of massive domestic petroleum reserves. Wright's (1990) study of trade patterns shows that U. S. manufacturing exports were intensive in nonreproducible natural resources, and that this intensity increased from 1880 to 1930. This hypothesis ultimately rests on political union, as U. S. leadership in most raw materials was relative to individual nations in the fragmented European continent, not when compared to Europe as a whole.
18 U. S. leadership was sustained through World War II, but afterwards the U. S. relied more on imports of raw materials and less on domestic production.
Chasing the Frontier, Page 15
A critic might argue against the Wright hypothesis that free trade before 1913 allowed any small nation to import all needed raw materials, and that Japan's meteoric rise after 1945
was achieved despite the near-total lack of a domestic raw materials base. an "entirely different orientation governed by the desire to find substitutes for expensive and uncertain imports" (Nelson-Wright, 1992 , p. 1939 , suggesting that the American common market was the foundation of its superiority in resource-based production.
A Single Domestic Market and Mass Production. Nelson-Wright (1992) concentrate too heavily on the manufacturing sector and virtually neglect the role of the agriculture, transportation, and trade sectors in pushing out the American frontier of productivity and
Chasing the Frontier, Page 16
living standards. While they emphasize that the development of mass production was fostered by the availability and cheapness of raw materials, which encouraged development of efficient production techniques even if they wasted materials, surely the unique political achievement of the United States in creating a single continent-sized market was more important. The common U. S. market encouraged the early development not just of mass production but also mass marketing, with distribution made possible across the newly constructed national railway network. Abramovitz-David (2000, p. 53) emphasize that the large U. S. common market allowed pioneering "in the elaboration and replication of large, spatially distributed technological systems, including systems of business organization and public service provisions, " whether involving electricity supply, telephone systems, or much later, airline reservation systems.
The integration of the U. S. domestic market is crystalized in Cronon's (1991) isolated by dependence on a river system that was frozen for up to half the year, while only a few years later in 1872 the railroad and telegraph had arrived to bring instant price information and deliveries within three days from as far away as New York. Both information and distribution were further facilitated by the mail order catalogues which made possible reductions in retail markups, as well as mass production runs which cut the catalogue prices of bicycles and sewing machines by as much as two-thirds below prevailing retail prices during the period 1890-1910.
Chasing the Frontier, Page 17
There is no better testament to the trans-continental American marketplace circa 1910 than a classic song from one of the greatest of all American musical comedies, Meredith
Wilson's "The Music Man". (Johnson, 1997, p. 515) . This is roughly 780,000 square miles, triple the area of France.
20. See White (2000), a book manuscript which shows that a single application of the invention of the internal combustion engine, namely the farm tractor, by the 1950s had boosted U. S. annual GDP by more than eight percent, more than the current share in GDP of the entire U. S. information technology industry, including computers, software, and telecom equipment. was Europe's historical legacy of small fields carved up by ancient rules, in some places divided by old walls and hedgerows that not only limited the potential for adoption of modern agricultural machinery but also impeded construction of straight highways. America between the Appalachians and the Rockies was largely divided up by a boring but efficient system of square miles and quarter-miles. 19 The importance of land in the early development of the Wood served early Americans with the major source of fuel, the primary building material, and as an industrial raw material (Rosenberg, 1976) .
Land intensity was responsible indirectly for the swift ascendancy of American manufacturing, because cheap land and scarce labor provided a strong motive to buy, install, and invent labor-saving machinery and develop mass production methods. Agriculture itself fostered the flourishing of those sectors of manufacturing devoted to the refining of 21. A perfect way to experience the enormous contrast in agricultural land quality, accessibility, and size, even today, is to fly from Chicago, departing from the land of flat black earth divided in square-mile rectangles, to Frankfurt with its medium-sized curvy fields lying along river bottoms and hills, to central Italy with its tiny plots divided into narrow slices shaped like string beans.
22. An overview of the role of America's more equal income distribution and its "egalitarian spirit" is provided by Abramovite-David (2000, p. 79) . agricultural crops; the largest single industry in the U. S. in 1860, namely flour and meal, was soon displaced by slaughtering and meat-packing, which remained the largest through 1914 (Johnson, 1997, p. 532) . Land intensity is also related, of course, to the peculiar American custom of building large houses on large lots in dispersed metropolitan areas, as discussed above.
Newness. The United States had an inherent advantage that could not be matched by a hypothetical United States of Europe, and this was simply the fact that it was newly settled on a vacant continent. The fresh division of agriculture into large plots rather than irregular plots of medieval contrivance, together with prodigious gifts of free land to new settlers, is just the first example.
21 A common language is the second. The high motivation of newly arriving and self-selected immigrants is the third. Fourth is the labor mobility made possible by the lack of strong local ties and the readiness of immigrants to "move on." The absence of a royal or aristocratic upper class is the fifth, allowing for social mingling, intermarriage, and a greater sense of equality than in most European nations. America was a middle class nation from the start.
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Technology. Nelson-Wright (1992) "The first hints of trouble came in American clocks and firearms, massproduced with quasi-interchangeable parts. In 1854, the British government sent a mission to the United States to look further into this `American system'" (Landes, 1998, p. 449) .
Contemporary observers noted that every farmer was his own mechanic, and even when the population was largely agricultural, there began a tradition of mechanical tinkering and striving for incremental improvement. 242,000 square miles, a territory larger than France. Likewise the 1862 Homestead bill and its successors distributed huge quantities of farmland to eager natives and immigrants alike and has been called "one of the most important laws in American history" (Johnson, 1997, p. 491 ).
Invention was encouraged by an organized and well-enforced system of patents. Unique regulatory bodies like state public utility commissions encouraged investment by electric utility monopolies. High external tariffs encouraged the development of domestic manufacturing and a concentration on the domestic market. This litany of American success stories should not be overdone. Europeans still led in many fields; Germans invented the internal combustion engine and the first automobiles, and dominated the world chemicals industry, in part as a result of close collaboration between industry and the pioneering German research universities. If America was rapidly developing, it was polluted, chaotic, dirty, and crude. In the words of Rudyard Kipling about Chicago, "Having seen it, I desire urgently never to see it again. Its air is dirt. (Bettman, 1974) . 25. On electriciation, see Devine (1983) . On manufacturing productivity growth in the 1920s, see Kendrick (1961) , Table D -II, p. 465, the column labelled output per manhour. However, the great emphasis by David-Wright (1999) 27. David and Wright (1999) , in calling the productivity upsurge of the 1920s a "forgotten puzzle," cite the same quote from Solomon Fabricant's introduction to Kendrick (1961) ephocal book as is quoted in my own work (2000a) on the "big wave" of productivity growth. But the emphasis of David-Wright is quite different, since they discuss only the 1920s, mainly in the context of manufacturing, and they make no mention of the even more rapid increase in economy-wide MFP that occurred from 1928 to 1950.
American leadership in the production of automobiles that caused the American standard of living to run away from the European during the 1920s. Taking the same years as for household electrification, U. S. motor vehicle registrations soared from 0.9 million in 1912 to 26.7 million in 1929. By contrast European auto production had failed to take advantage of the new technology, with 1929 European registrations only 20 percent of the U. S. level and production only 13 percent (Johnson, 1997, p. 723) . Why automobile production took off in the U. S. and not in Europe has much to do with the technological genius of Henry Ford and Alfred P. Sloan, and other factors beyond the scope of this paper.
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The leading students of electrification and its impact on U. S. manufacturing productivity in the 1920s are Paul David and Gavin Wright (1999) . They address the intriguing question as to the timing of the productivity growth explosion in U. S. manufacturing in the 1920s; why did it take so long to exploit Edison's inventions of the 1870s and 1880s? 27 A central answer is that the rate of price decrease of electricity had substantially accelerated in the previous decade of the 1910s, an interesting parallel to the accelerating rate of decline in computer prices in contributing to the "New Economy" boom of the late 1990s.
Institutions mattered, as quirky local regulations on electric utilities were replaced by state public utility commissions that provided more protection to the property rights of electric utilities and encouraged them to invest. Another part of the answer is that old equipment Real wage convergence and divergence. Goldin and Margo (1992) This may possibly help to explain not just some portion of the "big wave" but also the backward slide of Europe relative to the United States noted above. Since Europe's only hope of duplicating the U. S. resource dominance was to trade resources freely among countries, the trade barriers of the 1920-50 period helped to solidify the U. S. advantage based on 28. "But the countries whose per capita incomes were closest to that of the United States in 1910 did not undergo an equivalent transformation at that time. Rather, their high school movements did not materialize for another thirty or more years. . . Not only was the high school movement from 1910 to 1940 a uniquely-American phenomenon, the secondary school as we know it today was a uniquely-American invention" (Goldin, 1998, pp. 349-50) . materials-intensive production while depriving European manufacturers of access to cheap raw materials.
Education. The role of educational policy has been a subject of debate. Claudia Goldin (1998, p. 346) documents the revolution in secondary education attendance in the three decades after 1910, with enrollment rates rising from 18 to 73 percent between 1910 and 1940. She attributes to the secondary school revolution a substantial part of America's productivity advantage over European nations at that time. 28 In contrast, Nelson-Wright (1992 , p. 1947 are skeptical of the role of secondary education in American industrial leadership. They argue that "as of 1950 there was no marked difference in average years of secondary education among the U. S., France, and Britain, all of them well behind Germany."
In denying the importance of American secondary education, they also emphasize the large share of machine operatives in American manufacturing who were foreign born or the sons of foreign-born, although they do not explain why the foreign-born who immigrated as children could not have benefitted from U. S. secondary education, much less the subsequent generation. Nevertheless, Nelson-Wright, while perhaps leaning too far to minimize the role of secondary education, cite approvingly the American innovation of "professional management" staffed by a "cadre of professional, educated, middle managers, a phenomenon that seems to have been almost exclusively American." They also praise the early American superiority in broadly based higher education, the development of engineering schools, and 29. In his later incarnation as a co-author with Paul David (1999) , Gavin Wright relented on the role of secondary education and cites approvingly the work of Goldin and Goldin-Katz on the expansion of secondary education and its provision of skilled workers to operate the new equipment of the 1920s.
30. Richard Overy (1995, Chapter 6) in a single brilliant chapter distills the essence of why the Americans and Russians produced so much and the Germans produced so little. Mark Harrison (1998) provides a longer but more tedious review of the relevant data for each country, including population and production capabilities. Francis Walton (1956) makes the American achievement come alive in a wealth of case studies and anecdotes. the development of world-class research universities which were both independent of business yet developed business-industry cooperation (Nelson-Wright, 1992 , p. 1942 into the making of weapons rather than improved machines or consumer goods. However, World War II also led to a great leap forward in U. S. productivity (evident in Figure 2 and Table 1 States, Colonial Times to 1957, series P203. surprised that Americans could produce a few hundred thousand military motor-powered vehicles and airplanes? The Russian army finally overwhelmed the Germans, carrying its supplies on 250,000 American trucks provided by lend-lease, but these were less than 10 percent of the American trucks produced during 1942-45. This motor-producing capacity was already in place in 1929 and greatly improved in quality during the 1930s. 31 Second, the U. S. advantage in materials-intensive production was still intact. The unified U. S. common market enabled the production of 42 percent more steel in 1944 than in 1929 and 155 percent more than in 1913.
Historical Statistics of the United
32 After the war a series of missions from western Europe came to learn the secret of America's industrial productivity. Foreign observers were stunned at the ease with which iron ore could be transported to the steel mills via secure inland waterways:
"Men fully aware of the obstacles to such an obvious natural union as a FrenchSaar and German-Ruhr coal-steel community gaped in awe at the smooth, unimpeded flowing together of the iron-ore riches of the Minnesota ranges with coal from the Pensylvania and West Virginia fields into the steel-region facilities of Pennsylvania and Ohio. To the everlasting aid of America stood the wisdom of the founding fathers [to prevent restriction of trade across state lines]" (Walton, 1956, p. 552) .
Another earlier theme ratified by wartime production was the "American system" of production. The use of mass production and interchangeable parts, which first alarmed the British in the 1850's, was formally codified in the two decades before World War II. Herbert
Hoover led an industry-wide effort in the years after World War I to establish fixed standards 33. For the history of the drive to achieve standards for screws, bolts, and universal joints, see Walton (1956), pp. 532-33. that would allow such mundane manufacturing parts as screws and bolts to fit together, no matter which supplier or final assembler was involved, and as Secretary of Commerce in the 1920s he established a Division of Simplified Practice within the National Bureau of Standards.
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A third theme introduced above was the role of engineers and engineering education.
In my reading about the production achievements of World War II, I am always amazed at how many stories of crisis and shortages are solved as in-house engineers ride to the rescue.
The postwar Anglo-American Council on Production, charged with learning from the American miracle, noted the importance of engineers: "[They] pointed out the close cooperation of the engineer-scientists with production management. They held vital to the secret of American industrial success the prominent role of the engineer, his grasp of manufacturing techniques, and his complete integration with administration" (Walton, 1956, p. 545 ).
Other aspects of World War II in our previous list of pre-1913 advantages include natural resource abundance and self-sufficiency, particularly in agriculture and petroleum, labor mobility made possible by a common language, and the "American system" of mass production, interchangeable parts, close cooperation between business management and engineers, and a tradition of mechanical tinkering. Finally the World War II experience involved massive government subsidies reminiscent of the building of the nineteenth century railroads; the U. S. government paid for a massive expansion in the floor space of U. S. 
VI. The Postwar European Catchup VI. The Postwar European Catchup
Europe has achieved a faster rate of productivity growth than the U. S. over each of the long intervals since 1950, as shown in Figure 3 and Table 1 . Yet without the previous information on levels and ratios of levels, the information on productivity growth rates alone leave us in the dark as to whether the U. S. entered a dark period of falling behind, or whether Europe was just catching up from its own previous dark period. We know from the previous discussion that Europe had fallen far behind the U. S. by 1950 for a combination of structural and temporary, war-related reasons.
The Easy Part of the Explanation The Easy Part of the Explanation
At first glance, it may seem obvious that Europe would easily be able to catch up to the U. S. as part of its postwar reconstruction. Yet this initial reaction that the European catch-up was "easy" or "obvious" ignores the powerful list of U. S. advantages, both before "Paris, empty of vehicles, needed neither traffic lights nor one-way streets; all cars had to be garaged at night; gas stations hand-cranked the pumps. Many small flats and houses had electrical services as low as 3 amperes, enough for a light bulb, a radio, perhaps an electric iron; anything more would blow the fuse wire. . . . Refrigerators were little known . . . . No point to a refrigerator unless one bought for several days at a time; no point to such shopping unless one could find all food needs in one place; and then only if one had a car to carry the comestibles home and an elevator in the apartment building to haul up the bags and bottles. . . . France had not really entered the twentieth century." 34. This tradeoff between unemployment and productivity and its role in explaining the gap between European and U. S. unemployment rates, is the main theme of Gordon (1997). eased by the transfer of technology from American-owned firms like Ford, Vauxhall, and Opel, not to mention the arrival of Japanese-owned auto factories in Britain and elsewhere.
Force-feeding Productivity Growth through regulations. Just as we have seen above that American productivity growth was held down in the service sector by an increasing supply of females, teenagers, and immigrants that made labor relatively cheap to employ, so some European countries forced up productivity through regulatory policy. A classic example is the French minimum wage, which boost productivity in restaurants by making it too expensive to hire bus boys and force capital-labor substitution by eliminating such American anachronisms as parking lot attendants and grocery baggers. In Germany stringent shopclosing hours, only recently relaxed, force consumers to do their shopping in a concentrated period, thus boosting retail productivity. In this and other ways, European institutions favor workers and American institutions favor consumers, explaining at least part of the substantially more even distribution of income in Europe. But as a negative counterpart, making labor expensive boosts the unemployment rate and accounts for part of the low level of hours per capita stressed earlier in the paper. Cited above as promoting rapid U. S. productivity growth during 1930-50 were barriers to trade, the temporary cessation of immigration, and pro-union New Deal legislation, all of which contributed to a narrowing of inequality and relatively high wages for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. This process went into reverse in the later half of the postwar era.
Wages started diverging after 1970, with a sharp increase in inequality in the 1980s and 1990s that was reflected in a big jump in the rate of return to college education, mainly because the real wages of high school graduates fell. This process was the outcome of a complex process in which changing technology, an increased supply of cheap imported manufactured goods, and a renewed flow of immigration interacted to erode the rents previously earned by union members with high school educational attainment. This, in turn, partly reversed the stimulus to higher efficiency that took place in the 1940s.
The Remaining American Margin and Sources of Disadvantage The Remaining American Margin and Sources of Disadvantage
This leaves the remaining items on the pre-1913 list of American advantages still intact.
While the American land/labor ratio was falling as the population grew, the U. S. still had a substantial advantage in agricultural productivity. The United States still had a common language that facilitated labor mobility, which in turn reduced the NAIRU, increased the labor force participation rate, and helped explain why in the context of Figure 4 the U. S. had a substantially higher ratio of employment to population. It still had its world-leading research It is too soon to declare that the American productivity growth revival is a will-o-thewisp, since the average annual growth rate has been almost as high since the peak of the New Economy boom in mid-2000 as it was from 1995-2000. However, profound questions relevant to this paper are raised by Europe's failure to experience a similar productivity growth revival. Part of this is an aggregation problem -some parts of Europe, e.g., Ireland, Sweden, and Finland, have experienced productivity growth rates in the 1990s much faster than the U. S. Europe is dragged down by its backward areas that have low penetration of personal computers and low MFP growth, most notably the "olive belt" consisting of Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece.
But another implication of the European experience is that the role of computers and software in the U. S. productivity revival may have been exaggerated. The retail trade sector, where much of the revival has occurred, illustrates the problem. Surely a major source of U. S. productivity growth in retailing has been the growth of Walmart, Home Depot, and Target at the expense of small ma-and-pa hardware and clothing stores. Yet the ma-and-pa stores have laser bar-code readers for consumer check-out and often are hooked up to a computerintensive wholesaler. The productivity advantage of Home Depot surely involves more than just the use of computers, but rather reflects economies of scale that reduce costs and raise revenue by attracting customers through huge selection.
VII. Conclusion VII. Conclusion
Standing back from this comparison of Europe and the United States over a period of time that corresponds to the "long run" of economic theory, an initial question is where growth theory fits in, with its emphasis on the saving rate, capital-labor substitution, technical change, human capital, and research. Differences in saving rates play little or no role in explaining the growth gap between the U. S. vs. Europe. The much higher initial U. S. land/labor ratio boosted real wages, which in turn created pressure for substitution of capital for labor in the nineteenth century U. S. to a greater extent than in Europe. Technical change was clearly relevant, particularly the more rapid exploitation by the U. S. of the key inventions of the second industrial revolution, electricity and the internal combustion engine, in the period 1900-1950. Human capital plays a role, both in the expansion of U. S. secondary education in the early twentieth century and the rapid postwar increase in the percentage of the population completing college. Both human capital and research are involved in the international lead taken by American research universities in the era after World War II.
Nevertheless, many of the central concepts of this paper barely surface in growth theory, including raw materials intensity, internal free trade, mass marketing, "newness," giveaways of free land to homesteaders and railroad barons, immigration, and international trade autarky.
Looking back at the long history of Europe falling behind the U. S. and then catching up, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this topic has more to do with politics and history 36. Given the cast of characters at this AEA session, I hasten to add, "That's why we have economic historians!" than with economics. 36 The sources of U. S. advantage prior to 1913 center on its internal common market, an achievement of the Founding Fathers, Abraham Lincoln, and the Union Army, rather than any particular genius at business or technology, and free internal trade led in turn to exploitation of raw materials and leadership in materials-intensive manufacturing.
Postwar Europe gradually rid itself of internal trade barriers and largely caught up to the American productivity frontier as a result. But America's nineteenth century advantage went far beyond its internal common market. Even a hypothetical United States of Europe, formed in 1870, could not have matched America's land-rich "newness" that fostered large-scale farms, internal mobility, a flood of immigrants without an overlay of class conflict, and a continuing effort to invent new machines and production techniques to replace scarce labor.
America's productivity advantage opened a wider gap with Europe during 1913-50, not just because the U. S. avoided wartime damage, but because it was able to exploit the great inventions, particularly electricity and the internal combustion engine, 30 to 40 years earlier than Europe. As open trade and immigration were cut off between 1930 and 1950, and New Deal legislation allowed unions to flourish, unskilled and semi-skilled labor was able to earn relatively high wages that created further incentives for capital-labor substitution.
As Europe recovered from war in the 1950s and 1960s, there was a rich menu of technology to exploit, and closing the gap with the American productivity frontier was only a matter of time. But closing the gap involved more than mere European mimickry of 37. The data underlying Figures 2 and 3 show that in the year 2000, productivity levels compared to the U. S. were 6 percent higher in Belgium, 4 percent higher in France, 2 percent higher in the Netherlands, and virtually tied in Germany.
previous American achievements. The U. S. lost not only its superior access to raw materials, but also its technological leadership in key areas of manufacturing, including automobiles and machine tools. The revival of immigration and return of open trade pushed down the relative wages of unskilled workers and promoted indiscriminate hiring of unskilled domestic and immigrant workers to perform menial jobs in the service sector that had largely disappeared in Europe.
The twenty-first century begins on an ambiguous note. Europe envies the U. S. hightech boom of the late 1990s and its associated productivity revival. Try as it might, Europe can't duplicate the American productivity revival, no matter how much hardware and software it buys from Dell, Intel, and Microsoft. A plausible hypothesis is that the U. S. productivity growth revival since 1995 has relied less on a payoff from computer investment and more on a wide range of contributions that reflect longstanding U. S. advantages, from biotech research in collaboration with universities, to "Big Box" retail stores allowed under lenient U. S. urban land-use regulationsbut the U. S. productivity revival was short-lived. Over the five years 1995-2000 the U. S. briefly caught up to the European rate of productivity growth, but over any longer period, e.g., 1990-2000 or 1973-2000 , the U. S. growth rate lagged behind. As one European nation after another overtakes and moves past the U. S. level of productivity, one might conjecture that in ten years conferences will be organized at American universities on "the sources of European advantage." 
